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ABSTRACT 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI
1
 thereafter) is very important for economic growth in transition 
economies. They have major impact in economic development as a source of physical capital, 
diffusion of technology, improvements in management and marketing techniques, and enhancing 
institutional setting of these economies toward market oriented.  In this paper, an institutional 
approach to FDI inflow is investigated to identify relevant factors that have shaped and influenced 
transition economies. The role of institutions in the inflow of FDI in transition economies is 
estimated empirically by using Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) technique.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ransition economies in general have been one of the main fields of research for economists for the 
last 17 years. This is due to many questions that arise about the economic system as a whole and the 
uniqueness of such a great and unprecedented transformation. In this paper, an institutional approach 
to foreign direct investment inflow is investigated to identify relevant factors that have shaped and influenced 
transition economies. 
 
The approach that has been proposed draws on institutionalists’ theses asserting that underlying institutions 
in general drive economic activity. We take this idea and apply it to FDI inflow in transition economies. This is 
because these countries have undertaken great institutional transformation in their efforts to move their planned 
economies to market oriented economies. This approach to foreign direct investment flows will increase our 
understanding of both institutional impact and FDI inflow in these countries economies.  
 
Conclusions drawn are that institutions, as the core part of an economic system in transformation, play a 
crucial role in the flow of FDI, which in turn facilitates and accelerates economic reform. These forces are dualistic 
in nature in the sense that some can be transformed fast but the embedded force will be a barrier for the change to 
have a full effect on the economy. The embedded institutions are those coming from the inherited tradition, culture, 
and informal interactions of agents in the market. 
 
The econometric model proposed in this study is that of fixed effect panel data econometric analysis. A 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) will be used to correct for heteroscedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation (Dielman, 1989). This will allow capturing FDI variations in time and space and 
explain the variation on FDI by the variation of independent variables. A number of hypotheses are posited, 
methodology and data gathering are described, and econometric technique and results are discussed. The transition 
economies covered in this study are those of Central and Eastern Europe. We have shown that institutions (whether 
formal or informal and whether created or adopted) along with government policies (mode of transition and 
exchange rate regime for example) are very important forces that will attract FDI flow. The problem with 
                                                 
1
 FDI takes place when a firm acquires ownership control of a production unit in a foreign country. There are three 
basic forms of FDI: -establishing new branch, -acquiring control share of an existing firm, and –participating jointly 
in a domestic firm. World Bank defines FDI as follow: “Foreign direct investment is net inflows of investment to 
acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy 
other than that of the investor.” 
T 
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institutions is that one would face very difficult job to measure them or their progress. This issue has been 
tentatively solved in our paper by employing data from Freedom House (Nation in Transit, 1998 and 2002). 
 
SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
 Empirical studies on the FDI inflows can be grouped into two categories: studies on FDI inflows and 
outflows in transition economies, and studies focused on the institutional aspects of FDI. The second group of 
studies has been done with reference to developing countries, like Latin American countries and other developing 
countries. The first group of studies is mostly country case studies (we focus on studies done with respect to 
transitional economies). 
 
 Fabry (2001), in “The role of inward-FDI in the transition countries in European analytical framework”, has 
studied the different effects (roles) that FDI might have in a transition economy. She has divided these roles in two 
groups: FDI contribution with reference to modernization and an increase in efficiency, therefore reorienting the 
production process, and FDI impacts- absorption of FDI from host country, assimilation and diffusion of knowledge. 
By using Granger causality test, the author argues that FDI may help the transition economy up-grade, but FDI itself 
is not suited to replace industrial and technological changes for long-term growth. 
 
 Using firm-level data based on a worldwide survey of companies in 1995 and covering 25 transition 
economies, S. H. Zeghni (2001), shows that there is a positive relationship between countries’ transformation 
progress and the probability of a country being chosen for FDI inflows. Applying a probit model the following 
factors are chosen to be as determinants of FDI in this study: GDP per capita (as an proxy for the size of the market), 
growth rate of GDP, transition progress, regional tension, entry cost index, WTO (World Trade Organization) 
membership and/or applicant, and telephone lines. His two major findings are: a positive relationship between 
countries progress in transforming the economy towards market and FDI attraction, and decrease in regional tension 
and FDI inflows. 
 
 Szanyi (2001) has studied different aspects, like Greenfield investment versus privatization and FDI 
evolution, of FDI in Hungarian economy during its unique transition from centralized economy to a free market. The 
author concludes, “The motivations of foreign investors are combined differently in privatization and Greenfield 
investments. Market seekers tend to participate more in privatization; resource seekers prefer Greenfield 
investments.” In addition, he points out the importance of creating basic political and economic stability and a 
working institutional framework to increase the efficiency of FDI inflows. His analysis is more of a survey in nature 
and his conclusions are not backed by data.  
 
 Antaloczy and Sass (2001), using data, argue that Greenfield FDI is due to IFTZ’s (industrial free trade 
zone) adding to the location component of Dunning’s OLI thesis. IFTZ’s were first introduced in 1982 with an 
objective of attracting export-oriented high technology FDI to Hungary.  
 
 Empirical studies on FDI inflows in transition economies have been limited due to the lack of data and 
short period of time in which countries have been undergoing major changes. These studies are more of a case study 
of a particular country than of a general study of a region. Institutional factors that influence the FDI have more 
often been theorized and hypothesized than tested. 
 
 Political stability and government policies have been recognized as factors that influence FDI flows along 
with others, like market imperfections, size of the market, and geography. Nigh (1986) studied two classes of 
political events (intra-nation, and inter-nation events) and their effect in the FDI  decisions of US multinational firms 
to invest in Latin American countries.  
 
 He used a panel data analysis to examine the relationship between political events and FDI for two reasons: 
to increase the sample size and the reliability of estimates of the regression parameters. Data used are time series for 
21 years (1954-1975) crossed over eight countries (Mexico, Panama, Columbia, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Chile, and 
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Argentina). The conclusion of his study is that “investors assess political events in general rather than investment-
specific terms.”  
 
 His approach uses political events to explain the variation on FDI flows. The expansion of this approach, by 
using a combination of institutional factor (political stability and civil liberties) and policy factor (trade index, 
inflation, and exchange rate control) as determinants of FDI flows would be more appropriate for transition 
economies. The focus will be studying the relationship between FDI and institutions that affect its flow in different 
countries, i.e., transition economies. In addition, there will be an empirical estimation of the effects of institutions 
and policies in FDI flows in these countries. An analysis of how institutional changes take place in these countries is 
proposed in this paper in order to provide the background for the relationship between institutions, policies 
(government), and FDI inflow. 
 
THE MODEL, DATA, AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
 It has been shown that institutional reform and economic policies in transition economies is far more 
complicated than what the “Washington consensus” has suggested. It also can be stated that both affect the FDI 
inflow in transition economies. A model in which institutional reform and economic stabilization policies play a 
crucial role on the FDI inflow is presented. We will assume that the amount of FDI in a given country will be 
determined by two factors, the institutions to be developed (formal and informal institutions), and the countries’ 
policy with respect to foreign investments. From the institutional progress point of view, the one that will most 
likely affect the level of FDI will be political stability (to be defined below), degree of privatization of state 
properties, and development and enforcement of private property rights (included in the civil liberties index). The 
policy factors that will affect inflows of FDI will be economic stability expressed in two measurements; controlling 
of inflation, and an exchange rate regime that a country adopts. Also, the level of openness will determine capital 
inflows. 
 
 The panel data (a combination of time series with cross sectional data) model will be used to study such 
effects. Symbolically the model we are using can be written in a log-log form as follow: 
 
ln(Y ) = α +β ln(X ) +β ln(X ) +β ln(X ) + γ ln(Z ) + γ ln(Z ) + γ ln(Z ) + ε .
1 2 3 1 2 3it i 1it 2it 3it 1it 2it 3it it
                         (1) 
 
Where i = 1, 2, …, N refers to cross-sectional units, hereafter referred to as countries, and t = 1,2, …, T refers to a 
given time period. Thus Yit is the value of a dependent variable (foreign direct investment) for a country i at time t, 
and Xkit (and Zkit) is the value of the k-th explanatory variable for country i at time t. The βkit and γkit are unknown 
response coefficients of variation in Y for changes in X’s and Z’s independent variables. Dependent and 
independent variables are in the natural logarithm. The equation (1) estimates the elasticities of FDI with respect to 
GDP (gross domestic production), inflation rate, exchange rate fluctuations, the level of openness of the economy to 
international market, political stability index, and civil liberties index.  
 
 The independent variables are as listed:  
 
X1it = country’s Gross Domestic Product, measured in thousands of dollars, X2it  = inflation rate level, X3it  = 
exchange rate in transition country against U. S. dollar, Z1it  = openness index (it is calculated as a ratio of total trade 
(exports plus imports) to GDP), Z2it  = political stability index for each country over time (this index is in the scale 
from 1 (when political rights are high) to 7 (the least political stability)), Z3it  = civil liberties indexes, also varies 
from 1(the highest level) to 7 (the lowest level of civil liberties in the country).  
 
The model presented here does not intend to capture every single determinant of FDI in transition 
economies as suggested by other theories that have been developed up to this point. However, the case that 
institutions and economic policies heavily influence FDI has been made and it will be evaluated empirically. We 
will use political stability index and civil rights index as measures that can capture the institutional reform and 
progress. The variation on the inflation rate and exchange rate will be used for economic policy variables. 
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 We run a regression employing pooled cross-sectional data described above using EVIEWS. We assume 
that the intercept is nonrandom and varies across countries. Slope coefficients are constant across countries and 
across time. Given the fact that countries are different in size (fact that will be reflected in different magnitudes of 
data on independent and dependent variables) heteroscedasticity across sections is present (meaning that the error 
term is correlated within sections).  
 
 To correct for cross sectional heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous correlation, and unbalanced panel data 
we use the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model (SURE), which is becoming a popular method of estimation 
when such problems exist (Baltagi, 2001).  
 
Countries Chosen 
 
 This study will be limited to ten transition economies: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Macedonia (FYR), Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. There are at least two reasons for 
this selection. The first reason is the commonality in space; they are geographically similar. Despite the cited 
similarities, Central and Eastern European countries vary greatly with respect to the economic conditions prevailing 
at the time of transition as well as the approaches they took with respect to transition. Since our interest is over the 
transition years, twelve-years-time-series of all variables for a given country will be used. 
 
 Data has been taken from the World Development Indicators published in 2003 by the World Bank (GDP, 
FDI inflow, inflation rate, total trade to GDP for openness index, and exchange rate) and Nations in Transit 
published every year from Freedom House (indexes for political stability and civil liberties progress
2
). Data used are 
for a period of twelve years, from 1990-2001. The size of the sample is 120 observations potentially, however due to 
some missing observations the panel data is unbalanced (and the number of observations used for the regression will 
be 98).  
 
Hypotheses 
 
 A number of hypotheses will be tested for two purposes. Testing will be for the purpose of accepting or 
rejecting the institutional progress and economic policy integrated model, and to draw conclusions about the policies 
that countries can undertake to enhance institutions and the level development by increasing the amount of foreign 
direct capital that flows in these countries. Hypothesis regarding the effect of market size, inflation rate, exchange 
rate fluctuations, openness of the economy to the international market, political stability, and civil liberties on FDI 
inflow will be tested to increase the understanding of their impact on the FDI inflows in these countries. 
 
 H1: FDI varies directly with political stability and political rights. An improvement in political rights 
indirectly creates a welcoming atmosphere for international businesses by lowering the level of uncertainty. Reforms 
and policies can become more predictable from a business point of view. This relationship is derived from the 
institutional path-dependence evolution model as described earlier. Countries have an adaptation function that is 
specific depending on the countries’ reforms and level of development before the transition period. A flatter curve 
for this function means that the country can easily adopt new institutions and create a welcoming atmosphere for 
FDI flowing into the country.  
 
 Data on political stability for transitional economies shows that there is a positive relationship between 
progress in political stability and FDI inflows into the country. FDI varies directly with economic stability in a 
country. This variable will be designed to capture all the economic reforms including the development of property 
rights, privatization progress, and others. This hypothesis is different compared to the first one as it tries to explain 
difference in FDI by variations in the economic environments. 
 
                                                 
2
 We use these indexes for two reasons.  One is because they are available to the public, therefore in the public 
domain. Secondly, because they are free of charge.  
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What is the relationship between FDI flows and privatization in the country? The expectations would be 
that there is a positive relationship if privatization was opened to foreigners. If foreigners were not allowed to 
participate in direct privatization of state owned assets then it may be the case that there is a lagged positive 
relationship between FDI flow and privatization. This can be explained by the possibility of the domestic buyers 
willing to sell privatized assets to foreigners. The privatization index will be composed as a percentage of GDP 
privatized in a given year for a given country. 
 
 H2: FDI will vary inversely with inflation. Inflation can be seen as a negative sign for multinational that 
wants to invest in a country for at least two reasons. The first reason has to do with returns on invested capital that 
varies inversely with inflation in the economy. An increase in the inflation rate, for example, will decrease the real 
returns on the FDI inflow. Rate of return is a primary concern of businesses if it wanted to locate their production 
abroad. The other reason is that inflation signals foreign investors that the country’s policy is “out of hand.” High 
inflation means that a government’s policies and a central bank’s monetary policy are not satisfactory, and therefore 
the FDI inflow will decrease as inflation increases.  
 
 H3: FDI inflow varies directly with exchange rate fluctuations (the exchange rate here is defined as a ratio 
of Local Currency Units to U. S. dollar). This is assumed to happen for the same reasons as those for inflation. A 
two-fold effect will cause such relationship between exchange rate and FDI inflow. First, a stable exchange rate will 
signal investors that the government policies are working and the country’s economy is not shocked by any policy 
variable that will effect their investment and returns.  In an economic environment with small exchange rate 
fluctuations, returns on the investment expressed in dollars will be safer. Second, an increase in the exchange rate 
(causing local currency devaluation) will decrease the initial cost of FDI inflow (it takes less dollars to acquire the 
same amount of capital in this particular country).   
 
 H4: FDI varies directly with the level of country’s openness. The level of openness is a determining factor 
on the FDI inflow. Openness index, measured as a percentage of trade to GDP, is a policy variable affected by the 
institutional development in the country and in the analysis it is considered as such (however, it has been denoted by 
(Z) in the model expressed by equation (1)). This is the first necessary condition for FDI to flow into a country. The 
less restrictive policy is on international trade (and capital movement), the more FDI flows in a country. Foreign 
firms (multinationals and/or FDI) will find it easy to export it products abroad if there are less restrictions on the 
export of goods. Less restriction on the imported goods means that the cost of moving part of the capital from the 
home country to a host country will be lower. This process is cumulative as the general economic environment 
becomes more promising for “followers.” 
 
DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
 This section presents the results of regression analysis, main findings and discuses them. It also contrasts 
empirical analysis results with hypotheses stated earlier in this paper. SURE model of pooled cross section data is 
estimated to obtain intercepts (different for each country) and slope (β and γ) coefficients. Table 1 show the 
descriptive statistics of data (variables) used in regression analysis. 
 
 FDI and GDP are both measured in millions of U. S. dollars. The civil liberties index and political stability
3
 
index are a measurement of a county’s performance on institutional advancement to market economy. They vary 
from 1 (the best performance level) to 7 (the worst performance). This is to be considered when coefficients are 
presented and discussed as the negative sign on the respective coefficients for political rights and civil liberties 
means a positive relation between these indexes and FDI inflow.  
 
 
                                                 
3
 Political process examines national executive and legislative elections, the development of multiparty systems, and 
popular participation in the political process. Civil liberties assess the growth of nongovernmental organizations, 
their organizational capacity and financial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they 
function; the development of free trade unions; and interest group participation in the policy process. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Models 
 
 FDI 
(in millions 
of dollars) 
GDP 
(in millions 
of dollars) 
CL 
(index 
ranging  
1 to 7) 
ER4 
(exchange 
rate) 
INF 
(percentage 
annually) 
PR 
(index 
ranging  
1 to 7) 
OPN 
(in %) 
Mean 121.6086 3231.055 2.92 0.38 62.28 2.46 90.19 
Sum 12160.86 323105.5 292.00 38.34 6227.81 246.00 9019.35 
Maximum 934.1000 17625.62 7.00 0.75 1466.78 7.00 157.78 
Minimum 0.000000 70.97600 2.00 0.11 -1.19 1.00 39.14 
Std. Dev. 181.5308 3673.3768 1.11 0.14 178.40 1.43 28.78 
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Exchange rate is in real terms expressed in local currencies one needs to buy the same amounts of goods 
and services in the domestic market as the dollar would buy in U. S. A. Inflation is given as an annual percentage 
calculated using GDP deflator. The openness index represents the percentage of GDP exported and imported (traded 
with the rest of the world). Equation (1) is estimated using a double log econometric model with the SURE 
technique. All coefficients have the expected signs and the adjusted R
2
 is relatively high (it suggests that 80 percent 
of variation in FDI inflow is explained by the independent variables in the model). A report of the estimated 
coefficients is presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
 
Table 2: SURE Estimation of Determinants of FDI, Equation (1) with GDP Included 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
LOG(GDP) 0.093854 0.289392 
LOG(OPN) 1.860754 0.258696 
LOG(PR) -0.802942 0.158865 
LOG(CL) -0.674568 0.239965 
LOG(INF) -0.177878 0.058999 
LOG(ER) 0.716058 0.221357 
R-squared 0.834686 
Adjusted R-squared 0.804446 
Number of observations 98 
 
 
From the coefficients of the independent variables, only GDP (a proxy for the size of the market variable) 
is statistically insignificant. All other coefficients are statistically significant as statistical t’s are higher than the 
critical value of 2.66 (there are 92 degrees of freedom after we subtract number of variables from the total number of 
observations). For this reason, another regression is run excluding GDP as an independent variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
The real effective exchange rate is given by the nominal exchange rate (ration of LCU per dollar) multiplied by the 
price ratio. This is measured by the purchasing power parity conversion factor. It is the number of units of a 
country’s currency required to buy the same amount of goods and services in the domestic market as a U.S. dollar 
would buy in the United States. 
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Table 3: SURE Estimation of Determinants of FDI, Equation (1) with GDP Excluded 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
LOG(OPN) 1.841944 0.256213 
LOG(PR) -0.834605 0.132046 
LOG(CL) -0.654351 0.217038 
LOG(INF -0.224497 0.035758 
LOG(ER) 0.547402 0.209790 
R-squared 0.836617 
Adjusted R-squared 0.809058 
Number of observations 98 
 
 
Next, a discussion of these coefficients is presented. Since a double logarithmic econometric model is used, 
all coefficients on the independent variables represent elasticities (they show the percentage change on FDI inflow 
for a percentage change on the independent variable). Let us denote elasticities with E. For example, elasticity of 
FDI inflow with respect to GDP (given as a percentage change in FDI inflow for a percentage change in the GDP) 
will be given as follows: 
 
XY 1E = β =Y,X 1
X Y1 1


.                                                                                                                                            (2) 
 
Analogously, all other  ’s estimated using equation (1) represent respective elasticities of FDI with respect to X’s 
and Z’s variables. 
 
 Let us first discuss the effect of the size of the market on the FDI inflow. From the regression analysis, the 
coefficient representing GDP effect on the FDI inflow is not statistically significant. The economic significance is 
questionable from the estimation point of view (its coefficient relative size is small compare with other variables in 
the model). Why is this case? Size of the market should affect FDI inflow; however, in this case FDI inflow is 
peculiar in the sense that most of it is in the form of change of ownership of the country’s assets.  
 
 It is difficult to obtain data represented as a percentage of FDI due to privatization. The World Investment 
Report (2001) emphasizes this (FDI through privatization) as a key factor that might have decreased the importance 
of the size of the market effect. The conclusion from the data available is that FDI inflow in countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe are neither market seeking nor resource seeking.  
 
 Another regression without GDP as a measure of the size of the market is run and presented in Table 2. The 
result is not different than the regressions with GDP included, leading to the conclusion that the model is not 
misspecified. One possibility is that the coefficient of openness, which is relatively large (1.86) might have captured 
the size of the market effect.  
 
 The openness coefficient shows that policies and institutions that attract FDI would be those that have 
liberalized the FDI inflow restrictions as measured by percentage of total trade to GDP. That is, the higher the level 
of exports and imports in the country, the greater the FDI inflows. The volume of trade is related, among other 
things, to the favorable regime of taxes and tariffs that country has adopted. This policy aims to increase foreign 
direct investment and improve the social conditions in the country.  
 
 FDI elasticity with respect to openness is 1.86. That means that a one percent increase in the openness has 
caused 1.86 percent increase in the FDI inflow. As an example, if openness index increased from 90 to 92 percent 
(2.2 percent) the FDI inflow will increase by (1.86x2.2 percent or 4 percent) 4 percent or in absolute terms, it will 
increase from 120 million to 125 million (by 5 million U. S. dollars). 
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 Next, we analyze the results of estimation with respect to institutional progress in transition economies. 
Political stability and civil liberties have a significant impact on the FDI inflow. As shown in the Table II.5, FDI 
elasticity with respect to these variables is relatively large (FDI elasticity with respect to political stability is 0.80 
and the FDI elasticity with respect to civil liberties index is 0.67). The negative sign is due to the way indexes have 
been measured (an increase in the index shows that political stability and civil liberties has worsened). 
 
 As an illustration, suppose that political stability index changed from 2.8 to 2.5 showing a progress towards 
more stability in the country. This is approximately a 10 percent improvement in the political stability index. This 
will cause FDI inflow to increase by 8 percent (0.8x10 or 8 percent) or FDI will change from 120 million U. S. 
dollars to 129.6 million (an absolute increase by 9.6 million dollars). The same progress in the civil liberties (an 
improvement of civil environment from 2.8 to 2.5, for example) will increase the flow of FDI by 6.7 percent or by 8 
million dollars.  
 
 Foreign firms view political stability and civil liberties as factors that lower the uncertainty of their business 
and profits. In addition, a stable country may have settled official and unofficial rules (formal and informal 
institutions) to favor and welcome foreign investors. A positive attitude towards foreign investment is very attractive 
for foreign firms to consider when actually moving into the country. The empirical results reveal that FDI inflow is 
affected more by the political stability as compared with civil liberties. 
 
 Inflation is a significant factor determining the level of FDI (FDI elasticity with respect to inflation rate is - 
0.17). All that we can say about inflation’s impact on FDI inflows is that inflation when under control (kept at a 
lower level) attracts more FDI in the country and in the region. In addition, a low inflation rate signals investors that 
the monetary policy is being handled properly and the real returns from investing in these countries will be closely 
matching investor expectations. 
 
 With respect to the effect of the exchange rate variability in the FDI flow, the estimated elasticity is 
statistically significant and is relatively large (FDI elasticity with respect to changes in the real exchange rate is 0.7). 
Findings are consistent with and supportive of the hypothesis stated earlier and show that foreign firms see exchange 
rate as a factor that affects their purchasing power. A real depreciation of domestic currency by one percent will 
increase FDI inflow by 0.7 percent.  
 
 Several policy implications can be drawn from these results. First, policy lessons for these countries and 
their respective governments are to strengthen the institutions that determine both political stability and civil 
liberties and also formulate and carry out sound economic policies. Applying and monitoring well-formulated 
economic and social policies would attract more foreign direct investment in these countries. Another very 
important lesson is that countries should liberalize their export and import regimes. These will affect both exports, 
imports, i.e. the total trade and will increase the level of FDI inflow. 
 
 This study is limited by the time. Contributions include an effort to formalize and expand the understanding 
of development of institutions in the transition economies, linking it with FDI flows, and generating results that 
show not only the effects that these institutions have on FDI but also show the way policy can be formulated.  
___________________ 
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